



PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2014

2 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper



READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Choose **one** of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer **two** questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of **7** printed pages and **1** blank page.

Choose **one** of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer **two** questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

Topic 1 Epistemology

Answer Question 1 **and** either Question 2 **or** Question 3.

Section A

Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could *almost* say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated *Thoughts* or *Ideas*. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them *Impressions*; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

[Extract from **David Hume**: *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*:
Section II, OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS, Sections 11–12]

- 1 (a) Explain Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas. [10]
(b) Evaluate Hume's account of impressions and ideas. [15]

Section B

- 2 'For a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs.'
Critically assess coherentism as a theory of epistemic justification. [25]

OR

- 3 Evaluate Berkeley's view that material objects are simply ideas in the mind. [25]

Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language

Answer Question 4 **and** either Question 5 **or** Question 6.

Section A

... the question 'Is belief-in reducible to belief-that?' is a complicated and difficult one. There is much to be said on both sides. We began by considering a number of examples which suggest rather strongly that no such reduction is possible. Instead, they suggest that belief-in is an attitude quite different from belief-that. We have now considered a number of other examples, which suggest equally strongly that belief-in *is* reducible to belief-that. What conclusion are we to draw when we consider both sets of examples together?

The obvious conclusion is this: there are two different senses of 'believe in'. On the one hand, there is an evaluative sense. This is illustrated by believing in one's doctor, or believing in railways, or believing in a procedure such as taking a cold bath every morning. Something like esteeming or trusting is an essential part of belief-in in this sense. (The other part of it would be conceiving or having in mind whatever it is that is esteemed or trusted.) As we have seen, the 'objects' of belief-in, in this sense, are enormously various. It is a mistake to suppose that its 'object' must always be a person. There is a corresponding sense of 'disbelief in', where our attitude is something like disesteem or distrust. This is quite commonly expressed by saying 'I do not believe in ...', much as dislike is quite commonly expressed by saying 'I do not like ...' It is illustrated by 'we do not believe in waiting-lists', or by the disbelief in Mr. Gladstone which most contemporary British Tories had. In this sense of 'believe in', believing-in does seem to be a quite different attitude from belief-that and irreducible to it. The same applies to the corresponding sense of 'disbelieve in'.

On the other hand, there is also a factual sense of 'believe in'. The most obvious examples of it are the belief in fairies or the belief in King Arthur. Belief-in, in this sense, certainly *is* reducible to belief-that. In these examples one believes an existentialist proposition. One believes *that* there is something to which such and such a description applies.

... The most important of all the varieties of evaluative belief-in is belief in God ... It looks as if evaluative belief in God were both interested and disinterested ... Nothing could be more advantageous to us than the existence of God, if he is what theists believe him to be ... But as soon as we start thanking God for his gifts, being grateful for them with a gratitude which is not just 'a lively sense of favours to come', our belief in him ceases to be wholly interested. We are beginning to value him for his own sake, and to believe that it is a good thing, intrinsically good, that he exists and is what he is; and not just 'a good thing', but the fundamental 'good thing' without which there would be no others.

[Extract from **Basil Mitchell**: *The Philosophy of Religion*: VIII: 'Belief 'In' and Belief 'That''
by **H.H. Price**: pp. 151–152, 166–167]

- 4 (a) Explain the distinctions that Price makes between 'belief-that' and 'belief-in'. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Price's arguments about belief-that and belief-in statements and how these are applied to God. [15]

Section B

- 5 Critically assess ethical naturalism. [25]

OR

- 6 Assess the implications of the falsification principle for the philosophy of religion. [25]

Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion

Answer Question 7 **and** either Question 8 **or** Question 9.

Section A

Those imbued with a thirst for understanding will not find that science alone will quench it. Not only is there the teeming chaotic fertile world of personal experience, which the cold clear lunar landscape of science, populated by metastable replicating systems but with no people in it, so signally fails to describe. (Who thinks of himself as a collection of quarks, gluons and electrons?) There is also the founding faith that science depends upon, the *data* which themselves call irresistibly for deeper explanation. That the world is intelligible is surely a non-trivial fact about it and the basic laws and circumstance of the universe exhibit a delicate balance which seems necessary if its processes are to evolve such complex and interesting systems as you and me. It is surely inevitable to inquire if these facts are capable of a more profound comprehension than simply the statement that they are the case. If that further understanding is to be had it will be beyond the power of science to provide it. Let us consider these issues in a little more detail.

We are so familiar with the fact that we can understand the world that most of the time we take it for granted. It is what makes science possible. Yet it could have been otherwise. The universe might have been a disorderly chaos rather than an orderly cosmos. Or it might have had a rationality which was inaccessible to us ... There is a congruence between our minds and the universe, between the rationality experienced within and the rationality observed without. This extends not only to the mathematical articulation of fundamental theory but also to all those tacit acts of judgement, exercised with intuitive skill, which are equally indispensable to the scientific endeavour. That is too profound a fact to yield to superficial discussion. 'Evolution' can always facilely be invoked as the inexplicable explanation of what is found humanly to be the case. However it seems incredible that, say, Einstein's ability to conceive of the General Theory of Relativity was just a spin-off from the struggle for survival. What survival value does such an ability possess? ... Certainly our powers of thought must be in such conformity with the everyday structure of the world that we are able to survive by making sense of our environment. But that does not begin to explain why highly abstract concepts of pure mathematics should fit perfectly with the patterns of the subatomic world of quantum theory or the cosmic world of relativity, both of which are regimes whose understanding is of no practical consequence whatsoever for humankind's ability to have held its own in the evolutionary struggle ...

If the deep-seated congruence of the rationality present in our minds with the rationality present in the world is to find a true explanation it must surely lie in some more profound reason which is the ground of both. Such a reason would be provided by the Rationality of the Creator.

[Extract from: **John Polkinghorne**: *Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding*: pp. 20–22]

- 7 (a) 'The fact that we are able to understand the world calls for a deeper explanation than simply stating that this just 'is the case'.'

Explain Polkinghorne's evidence for thinking this.

[10]

- (b) Evaluate Polkinghorne's view that the reason why we can understand the world, and why the world can be understood by us, is that both are the creation of a rational God.

[15]

Section B

8 Analyse critically Hume's rejection of miracles. [25]

OR

9 Consider the view that to know there is life after death would solve the problem of evil. [25]

Topic 4 New Testament: The Four Gospels

Answer Question 10 **and** either Question 11 **or** Question 12.

Section A

²⁰When Martha heard that Jesus was coming, she went and met him, while Mary stayed at home. ²¹Martha said to Jesus, 'Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died. ²²But even now I know that God will give you whatever you ask of him.' ²³Jesus said to her, 'Your brother will rise again.' ²⁴Martha said to him, 'I know that he will rise again in the resurrection on the last day.' ²⁵Jesus said to her, 'I am the resurrection and the life. Those who believe in me, even though they die, will live, ²⁶and everyone who lives and believes in me will never die. Do you believe this?' ²⁷She said to him, 'Yes, Lord, I believe that you are the Messiah, the Son of God, the one coming into the world.'

²⁸When she had said this, she went back and called her sister Mary, and told her privately, 'The Teacher is here and is calling for you.' ²⁹And when she heard it, she got up quickly and went to him. ³⁰Now Jesus had not yet come to the village, but was still at the place where Martha had met him. ³¹The Jews who were with her in the house, consoling her, saw Mary get up quickly and go out. They followed her because they thought that she was going to the tomb to weep there. ³²When Mary came where Jesus was and saw him, she knelt at his feet and said to him, 'Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died.' ³³When Jesus saw her weeping, and the Jews who came with her also weeping, he was greatly disturbed in spirit and deeply moved. ³⁴He said, 'Where have you laid him?' They said to him, 'Lord, come and see.' ³⁵Jesus began to weep. ³⁶So the Jews said, 'See how he loved him!'

[John 11: 20–36 NRSV]

- 10 (a)** With reference to this passage, explain the different claims about who Jesus was. [10]
- (b)** 'The most powerful teachings in the New Testament are those concerning resurrection.' Examine this claim. [15]

Section B

- 11** 'To love God and to love each other is a complete gospel summary.' Examine and evaluate this claim. [25]

OR

- 12** 'There is no relationship between the Synoptic Gospels and John's Gospel.' Critically assess this claim. [25]

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Question 4 © Basil Mitchell; *The Philosophy of Religion*; Oxford University Press; 1971.
Question 7 © John Polkinghorne; *Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding*; SPCK; 1988.
Question 10 © New Revised Standard Version of the Bible; Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA; 1989.

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